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1Chapter 4: Pynchon and new materialism
Martin Paul Eve
This is an AAM of Eve, Martin Paul, ‘Pynchon and the New Materialism’, in The New 
Pynchon Studies, ed. by Joanna Freer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 
https://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/subjects/literature/american-literature/new-pynchon-
studies?format=HB 
Materialism, idealism, and Thomas Pynchon
Materialism is the philosophical school of thought that privileges physical matter above all 
other things, including thought and existence. For the die-hard materialist, all consciousness, 
experience, and other mental phenomena – as well as apparently supernatural happenings – 
can be attributed to physical causes. In a “naïve” or “pre-critical” materialism, such matter is 
thought to be independent of humans. As it was for the early Wittgensteinian incarnation of 
Captain Blicero (or Lieutenant Weissmann as he was then known) in Thomas Pynchon's V. 
(1963), in materialism the world is all that is the case (278).
Traditionally, materialism could be set against the philosophy of idealism. This model 
of idealism, albeit caricatured here for the sake of brevity, is one in which human senses do 
not necessarily have access to the real world.i Such a stance is introduced because it is 
impossible for humans to know whether matter exists independently of our senses, since we 
cannot step outside of our own human perception. Indeed, in its Kantian version, our very 
humanness distorts the thing-in-itself to conform to the preconditions of our sensory 
apparatuses.ii For instance, in the “Transcendental Aesthetic” – an early section of his 
Critique of Pure Reason – Kant writes that it is impossible for perception to exist separately 
from our concepts of space and time. For Kant, this does not mean that objects themselves 
2have spatial and temporal qualities. It instead means that our consciousnesses structure 
objects into spatio-temporal terms so that they can be perceived. In such a philosophy we can 
never know the truth of objects and instead only have access to the phenomena (our 
perception of the thing) and not the noumena (the thing-in-itself). Idealisms are philosophies 
of reference or signification since that which is presented to our senses refers to or signifies, 
but is not, the thing-in-itself (independent physical matter).
The novels of Thomas Pynchon sit uncomfortably between these two strains of 
philosophical thought. It will be clear to even the most green of Pynchon readers that his 
novels are scarcely materialist. In Gravity's Rainbow (1973), for example, the physical and 
chemical sciences are subjected to extreme scrutiny as emblems of a positivist materialism 
that leads to the culture of the V-2 rocket; the belief that scientific knowledge of physical 
processes can only ever lead in the direction of human advancement is thoroughly undone. 
On the same side of this debate, perhaps the most well-known of all of Pynchon's novels, The
Crying of Lot 49 (1966), famously asked whether the world was created by its protagonist’s 
mind: “shall I project a world?” (82). Indeed, the overt solipsism of Pynchon’s novels is 
precisely of the idealist school; the world is formed by individuals and does not necessarily 
exist independently of them. Furthermore, the supernatural or extraordinary occurrences that 
run through all of Pynchon's novels, up to the Ouija board incident in Inherent Vice (2009) or 
the fact that, in Bleeding Edge (2013) “there’s no shame in going for a magical explanation” 
(441), have an idealist quality to them. For David Cowart, Pynchon is the master of 
“challenging and subverting materialist complacency.”iii
On the other hand, though, Pynchon's novels also yield what I have referred to as a 
“quasi-materialism” and there are three reasons why his work is not well-served under a 
purely idealist label.iv The first is that the events Pynchon depicts that seem to express idealist
leanings, such as the supernatural space of the séance, are usually in fashion for the time-
3period that Pynchon is depicting; the details may be incidental and part of a mediated 
historiography.v The second reason is that Pynchon's supernatural spaces – “the beyond,” 
ghost-worlds, and dreams – are not wholly materially inaccessible, as they would be in an 
idealist setup. It is suggested, for instance, that in order to fend off the ghoulish “spiritual 
rampage” of the dead in Camp Dora in Gravity’s Rainbow, one can “[u]se the natural balance 
of your mind against them” (296), a crossing over between the material space of the brain and
the immaterial space of the mind that somehow allows access to the realm of the dead. 
Finally, Pynchon's work yields environments in which the external reality is controlled not by
the senses of the observer but by a malign outside entity. Elsewhere in Gravity’s Rainbow, the
reader is told, for instance, that “[t]he War has been reconfiguring time and space into its own
image” and that it is “their time, their space” (257, 326, italics in original). And Enzian 
claims, in a different context, that matter exists independently of individual subjective 
experience: “[n]one of it may look real, but some of it is. Really” (659).
In recent years philosophical thought has brought a set of loosely interconnected 
paradigms, dubbed “The New Materialism,” to the fore. The stance is primarily concerned, as
I will go on to outline, with the anthropocentrism of traditional philosophies of materialism 
and idealism. Indeed, if one traces Kant's original thought back, it is clear that idealist 
suppositions are predicated on human sensory apparatuses, while, conversely, materialisms 
tend to flounder in the face of arguments about human consciousness and its links to matter. 
This has led to the development of a new approach to materialist thinking that tries to refresh 
its account to work around such anthropocentrism.
Yet I will note, before turning to this “New Materialism” and Pynchon's position in 
relation to it, that materialism has itself already undergone several renewals. Most notably, 
the new materialism of the later nineteenth century fused a form of idealist logic developed 
by Hegel – the dialectic – with the new idea that an underlying study of material societal 
4economics might yield a historical truth: the unfolding of the historical dialectic. With respect
to this earlier “new materialism,” Pynchon leaves us in no doubt what he thinks: “Karl Marx, 
that sly old racist” (317).vi
The New Materialism
The “New Materialism” is one of a cluster of other closely related emergent philosophical 
theories: immanent naturalism, posthumanism, antihumanism, speculative realism, and 
object-oriented metaphysics.vii The main thinkers of the “movement” are Quentin 
Meillassoux, Karen Barad, Manuel DeLanda, Jane Bennett, Diana Coole, Samantha Frost, 
Sara Ahmed, Elizabeth Grosz, William E. Connolly, and Rosi Braidotti, among many 
others.viii In William E. Connolly’s definition, there are several features of this new 
materialism that differentiate it both from idealism and other previous forms of materialism:
1. A “protean monism” – in which it is asserted that minds are entangled with non-living 
entities, as traditionally conceived – challenges dualistic views of mind and body.
2. Matter is not regarded as dead or non-living but rather as in a relationship to various 
energies. It is an “energy-matter complex.”
3. Metaphysics, once thought to be dead and gone in philosophy, is back, albeit in a 
contestable form.
4. Subjectivity is stretched well beyond the bounds of the human, thereby yielding a 
post-anthropocentric philosophy. In other words, the human subject is seen as a 
construction but it is not treated as a ground.
5. A speculation on elements that exceed current understanding.
6. A sense of shifting ontological uncertainty, entwined with the epistemological.
7. A planetary approach to thinking about microcosmic matters.ix
5New materialist ideas have sprung from a variety of sources, and to some extent also seem to 
have grown independently. A recent edited collection on new- or neo-materialisms, for 
instance, interviewed prominent figures working within this space, only to find that, as just 
one example, Manuel DeLanda had not read the work of another interviewee, Quentin 
Meillassoux.x Indeed, it is inaccurate, really, to speak of “the” new materialism. Rather, a 
range of neo-materialisms, which share various precepts, have arisen over the past decade or 
so.
Core to this new materialism, insofar as it can be considered homogeneous, is a type 
of overcoming of binaries that is different to that found in the postmodern phase. A good 
example of this is furnished by Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin who turn to perhaps the 
ultimate postmodern theorist, Jean Baudrillard. Dolphijn and van der Tuin astutely point out 
that, when Baudrillard says of Disneyland that “[i]t is no longer a question of a false 
representation of reality but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer real,” he does not 
step outside the binary of the representational and the real but rather twists it around.xi In 
other words, the frequent reversals that we see in these types of postmodern thinking are not 
such radical breaks with the past. They are still a type of negational dialectic in which one 
continues to negate within the bounds of accepted dualities. New materialisms, on the other 
hand, generally work differently, casting aside previous binaries, the most important of which
to discard being life as somehow opposed to mere matter.
Another central aspect of the new materialism is that it takes aim at both a pre-
Kantian realist model and a post-Kantian idealism. In fact, as Quentin Meillassoux charts it, 
the past two hundred years of philosophical thought have been erroneously following a mode 
called “correlationism,” in which humans believe that “we only ever have access to the 
correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the 
other.”xii The problem that Meillassoux puts at the heart of this is that, under such a model, 
6thought is not capable of thinking objects that emerged at an ancestral time in which there 
was no subject capable of perceiving it (he calls this thought experiment the “arche-fossil”). 
Yet, empirical science continually manages to produce meaningful statements about such a 
time. It is in this way that the new materialism is designed to reinstate a way of thinking that 
acknowledges the limits of our perception while also granting a realism beyond the bounds of
the human species.
Pynchon beyond the Human
It is unwise to take theoretical or philosophical precepts and then merely apply them to 
literary works. There is a reason that fiction expresses itself in its own register, distinct from 
philosophical thought, even when we are dealing with the “novel of ideas.” Nonetheless, in 
the remainder of this chapter I will illustrate how Pynchon's novels intersect with the 
philosophical ideas explored above.
The novels of Thomas Pynchon have long held a post-anthropocentric viewpoint, at 
least superficially. As early as Gravity’s Rainbow, for example, a type of “mineral 
consciousness” is described in which the time-scales of experience for rocks are stretched, in 
language that is typically cinematic, to “frames per century [… or] per millennium” (612). 
Such a thinking is a type of new materialist practice that posits a center of consciousness that 
is distinctly non-human but also non-animal. Yet, at the same time, we might question 
whether such a view is truly post-anthropocentric. For the “intellectual system” that is 
ascribed to the rock is anthropomorphic: the consciousness is “not too much different from 
that of plants and animals” (612). In this way, even while subjectivity is here pushed beyond 
the bounds of humanity, it is done so by analogy to human consciousness. This is not, as Ian 
Bogost might put it, a true “alien phenomenology” in which the subjectivity of objects is 
made primal but instead a comparative understanding of non-human subjectivity.xiii It is one 
7that may admit that there is a “contingent being independent of us” but it remains one that is 
“of a subjective nature.”xiv
The classic example of such a quasi-post-anthropocentric stance in early Pynchon is, 
of course, the episode of Byron the Bulb in Gravity’s Rainbow (647-55). In this well-known 
section, the light bulb known as Byron appears to be immortal, never burning out, and thus 
thwarts the Phoebus cartel's attempts to build in a planned obsolescence for the sake of profit.
At first glance, it appears that such a narrative might perfectly fit the post-anthropocentric 
standpoint of a new materialism: a light bulb is imbued with a subjectivity that is constituted 
through the language of an “energy-matter complex.” After all, the language of the bulb is 
one of power grids and electricity, which brings in what was thought for a long time to be the 
original “animating force” of life ‒ its vitalism ‒ thereby reuniting two sides of a previous 
binary opposition.xv
Yet, the life cycle metaphors that are used within the tale of Byron the Bulb once more
transpose traditional conceptions of human and animal mortality into the realm of objects. 
Bulbs, we are told have lives, and “through no bulb shall the mean operating life be 
extended,” leading the narrator to remark that, like great prophets, such bulbs will be “either 
killed outright, or given an accident serious enough to make them stop and think” (655). In 
the imagination of Gravity’s Rainbow we certainly see consciousness stretched beyond the 
bounds of the human estate to which it was previously confined. However, I would also argue
that such a stretching is also more of a superposition, in which one way of thinking is laid on 
top of another. When thinking in terms of biological life cycles, even on metaphorical 
grounds, it becomes easier for us to “imagine” subjectivities beyond the human. However, it 
is unclear whether such subjectivities – if that word can even be used in these contexts – exist
within objects or whether, if we could perceive them, they would be recognizable as such to 
us. There is also the further challenge of communication in fiction. What would it look like to
8imagine and describe a non-human or even non-animal consciousness in fiction that did not 
bear resemblance to the known subjectivity of human readers? Would such a fiction be 
possible?
Even if Pynchon's non-human subjectivities are imbued with an anthropomorphism – 
from Byron through to Skip the speaking ball-lightning in Against the Day (2006) (73) – the 
leaps of his imagination towards speculative alternative realities (an underpinning notion of 
the new materialisms through the “principle of facticity”xvi) are well known and charted. 
Indeed, such a concept seems to sit well with the mid-range literary history of postmodernism
within which Pynchon’s work sits since, as Brian McHale charts the change in focus, the shift
from an epistemological to an ontological dominant in postmodern fiction closely tracks the 
contemporary movement in philosophical thought with which I am concerned in this 
chapter.xvii This is because in the change from an idealist notion of understanding being 
shaped by consciousness – an epistemology – the new materialism is more concerned with 
unstable ontologies; with the plurality of modes of being.
Pynchon has long been preoccupied with such issues of being and alternative 
ontological possibilities. However, the clearest of Pynchon’s explorations of such other 
realities lies, as Adam Lifshey puts it, “between Mason and Dixon’s marking of a 
rationalizing European narrative on one hand and the corresponding suppression of multiple 
hypothetical indigenous worlds on the other.”xviii When Pynchon writes, then, of the ways in 
which America served as a “Rubbish-Tip for subjunctive Hopes, for all that may yet be true” 
– even as the cartographic enterprise begins “changing all from subjunctive to declarative, 
reducing Possibilities to Simplicities” – he is himself mapping the way in which things could 
be very different, as almost every critical approach to the novel has noted (MD 345, italics in 
original). This ontological uncertainty is a core proposition of both the new materialism and 
9speculative realism, as both these philosophies hold that there is no reason why things should 
be as they are and that any other set of possible permutations are as likely.
That said, there are bounds to even this type of “otherwise-thinking” in new 
materialist and speculative realist models (as there are also in Pynchon's writing, to which I 
will return later). Core to these efforts is the abolition of all necessary logical rules except for 
the principle of non-contradiction (that a proposition cannot be true and false at the same 
time) and the principle of facticity (that things can be otherwise). The former – the principle 
of non-contradiction – must hold even in new materialist thinking since its eradication would 
undermine the possibilities of the principle of facticity. (That is: if statements could contradict
themselves and remain true then the principle of facticity, that things could be otherwise, 
could contradict itself, meaning that it would not be possible for things to be otherwise, 
leading to a logical paradox.)
In Against the Day, however, Pynchon presents various scenarios that seem to violate 
even the principle of non-contradiction. Bilocation, for instance, in which characters can 
appear in two locations simultaneously, as do the character(s) Renfrew and Werfner, appears 
to be such a phenomenon. Within a new materialist frame bilocation poses the question of 
whether an individual co-existing in two places at once – exhibiting a “predisposition to the 
echoic,” as Pynchon puts it – violates the principle of non-contradiction (AD 227). The actual
answer to this question rests on the relationship of linguistic propositions to the basic laws of 
physics. Is the contradiction of “Renfrew is here” the phrase “Renfrew is there” or “Renfrew 
is not here”? Indeed, not all negations in natural language constitute a formal logical 
negation. Time also has a part to play, as it does in Pynchon’s work. (As James Gourley 
notes, “bilocation and time travel are more closely linked than one might initially consider”; 
Inger H. Dalsgaard also links Pynchon’s representations of bilocation to technologies of 
travel and time distortion.xix) In a linguistic sense bilocation must possess a sense of 
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concurrency. “Renfrew was here” and “Renfrew is not here” clearly do not contradict each 
other.
Pynchon, though, leaves no ambiguity that his bilocation violates the basic rules of 
physics. To give another example from Against the Day, the Stupendica and the Emperor 
Maximillian “share a common engine room”; the two ships physically occupy exactly the 
same space, at the same time (519). These alternative physical ontologies are part of what 
Simon de Bourcier has called Pynchon's “impossible objects,” in which we must consider 
that the generally understood propositions of logic and physical science may not hold.xx 
Pynchon takes the new materialist focus on facticity – the plurality of modes of being – and 
stretches this to breaking point, going even further than the new materialists in violating the 
fundamental logical principles on which such stances usually rest.
This, of course, is the prerogative of fiction, as opposed to philosophy. For, while 
philosophy aims to describe and understand the complexities of the world, fiction is often less
mimetic, probing alternative realities for situations unfathomable within the bounds of logic 
to which reality is wedded. Fiction is free to craft such strangeness – imagination is the 
form’s prerogative, after all – and readers are free to interpret such oddities as either literal 
elements of a textual narrative or through “lateral” reading “solutions, sidestepping the crisis 
by passing into metaphorical identities,” as Pynchon puts it (AD 418). One such lateral 
solution has frequently been to cast Pynchon’s impossible dynamics into a political reading, a
move that is thoroughly in accordance with a new materialist philosophy.
New Materialism, Anti-Biologism, and Pynchon's Gender Thinking
While Pynchon’s worlds are certainly strange, we should also consider that our own is 
somewhat odd. As Karen Barad has pointed out, the field of quantum mechanics – while 
forming the basis for many hackneyed theoretical literary readings – has implications for how
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we think about the materiality of the gendered body; the strange entanglements between 
material elements question our very understandings of time.xxi For, in her reading, the intra-
actions between bodies and environments are not deterministic in the traditional senses of 
linear time. Causality runs across strange patterns of spacetimemattering that has implications
for social justice in the feminist space. The type of question that might be posed by such 
thinking is: how, for instance, does a future gender identity map onto a previous bodily 
materiality, if linear causality has been disrupted?
It may appear similarly strange to some readers to learn that new materialist 
approaches have often been central to debates in contemporary feminism. Sarah Ahmed, for 
instance, takes umbrage at the way in which new materialist philosophies often implicitly or 
explicitly claim that many forms of feminism are anti-biological. That is, Ahmed alleges that 
new materialists “caricature past feminisms” as focusing so strongly on the social 
construction of gender and sex that they ignore bodily realities. For Ahmed, this is simply 
untrue and thinkers such as Sedgwick, Frank, and Grosz conduct “an uneven distribution of 
the work of critique,” reading feminist writers with insufficient attention and bestowing more 
time on male than female authors.xxii
On the other side of this debate, Noela Davis disagrees with Ahmed's allegations 
against the new materialism. For Davis, the figures criticized most explicitly in Ahmed's 
piece are not accusing past feminisms of neglecting the materiality of the body but rather of 
engaging with such materiality in a space that is somehow apart from the social. Davis 
instead argues that, in the work of Karen Barad, “matter is not an object, absent or present, 
but instead ‘it’ can productively be considered as an active process” and this is what past 
feminisms are accused of neglecting.xxiii For Davis and Barad, nature and culture do not exist 
separately (or the bodily space and the separate socially conditioned space) but as 
natureculture together in an unfolding process, in Donna Haraway’s terms.xxiv
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Without commenting on the merits of either of these arguments, I suggest that they 
demonstrate that the abstract philosophical concepts of the new materialism are of real-world 
relevance for a set of engaged thinkers who wish to transform their theories into practice. The
works of Thomas Pynchon, though, are curiously framed with respect to feminist thought of 
any kind. Certainly, two of his novels have female lead characters: The Crying of Lot 49 and 
Bleeding Edge. Yet, as Joanna Freer points out, in many of Pynchon’s works women are 
treated as “(semi)-inanimate objects upon which men have a right (or even a duty) of 
possession, imposition or defilation.”xxv In Freer’s reading this situation does improve over 
the course of Pynchon’s literary career but only in relative terms to a somewhat low starting 
bar.xxvi
When it comes to the kind of new materialist approach put forward by Barad, in 
which bodies and social contexts are intertwined and cannot be treated separately, Pynchon’s 
representations of the male body are certainly far easier to align with this than his depictions 
of female bodies. For instance, in Gravity’s Rainbow the particular focus on the Pavlovian 
conditioning of Tyrone Slothrop is integral to the novel’s plot. This is an instance in which 
Slothrop's masculinity is directly tied to an ongoing process of exposure to environmental 
stimuli that at once wrests the character’s sexuality away from him (“The Penis He Thought 
Was His Own”) and also focuses upon the body’s relationship to this de-centering process.
There is rarely a commensurate focus upon the female body and its relationship to 
socially constructed notions of gender in Pynchon’s works. In the same novel, the closest we 
perhaps get is the query about whether Katje Borgesius’s performance as the Domina 
Nocturna, who enacts the sadistic coprophagous episode with Brigadier Pudding, interrelates 
traditionally opposed sets of genitalia and sexual function. In this episode, Katje wonders 
whether her potential constipation is “anything like male impotence,” thereby locating her 
analogical equivalent of Slothrop’s penis with the female digestive tract. On the other hand, 
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her “cunt” is described as a “fearful vortex” – a literal emptiness – from the perspective of 
Brigadier Pudding and she herself refers to it as “her last mystery” (235).
Even if this infamous scene in Pynchon’s early novel does present a reversal of 
conventional power and gender stereotypes, with a commensurate focus on the biological and
the interrelation of gendered spheres of experience, it is in other ways that Gravity’s Rainbow 
more thoroughly adheres to the question-lines of the new materialism as it informs feminism. 
For the challenge of the new materialism is to provide a mode of thought that is not merely 
predicated on an existing negation; feminist new materialisms do not define the female body 
in opposition to the male, for example, but query the entire premise of binary genders based 
on sexual difference. As Donna Haraway put it as far back as 1988: “bodies as objects of 
knowledge are material-semiotic generative nodes. Their boundaries materialize in social 
interaction. Boundaries are drawn by mapping practices; ‘objects’ do not pre-exist as such. 
Objects are boundary projects” (italics in original).xxvii This is, then, a question of undoing 
dualism, of seeing how the lines of separation that we map in order to delineate objects are 
part of a social process with material implications for human bodies.
As I have pointed out elsewhere, Pynchon’s novels do more than most to query the 
dualist framework that pervades Western thought.xxviii In the light of new materialist thinking 
about feminism, it is also fair to extend such a pronouncement and to say that the primary 
way in which Pynchon does so is through the body and the breakdown of the traditional 
division between the insides and outsides of bodily forms. In V. the plastic surgeon and maker
of beautiful bodies, Schoenmaker, makes the ironic statement “[i]nside, outside [...] you’re 
being inconsistent,” while in Gravity’s Rainbow Pirate Prentice is able to get “inside the 
fantasies of others” (48; 12). Also in the latter novel Edward Pointsman considers “the cortex 
of Dog Vanya’s brain” as the bridge between “[i]nside and outside,” while Kevin Spectro, the 
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more ethical of the pair, “did not differentiate as much [...] between Outside and Inside” (78-
9, 141).
In Pynchon's later works, there is a continued breakdown of the divides between the 
internal and the external (implying a critique of Cartesian dualism, the philosophy of an 
internal mental state and an external body). For instance, Mason and Dixon are told that their 
voyage will let them explore “any number of things you may have been wond'ring about both
inside and outside” (225), while in Against the Day the Vormance expedition is unable to 
contain the meteorite since “[t]rying to get it to fit inside the ship, we measured, and 
remeasured, and each time the dimensions kept coming out different – not just slightly so but 
drastically” (144). In other words, in this latter example, Pynchon’s entity is determined not 
just by its own objective existence but by its interaction with measurement. Its bodily size is a
combined result of the specific social situation within which it is gauged and the object’s 
innate properties intra-acting, to use Barad’s term denoting strangely interacting and 
constituting feedback loops, with those situations.
Such an intra-action, or onto-epistemology, is typical of new materialist philosophies. 
It is an onto-epistemology because, in Deleuze and Guattari’s words, “the concept is not 
given, it is created” or, in Barad’s terms, “[w]e do not obtain knowledge by standing outside 
of the world; we know because ‘we’ are of the world” (italics in original).xxix In challenging 
dualism thus, from the early writing in V. right up to Bleeding Edge, Pynchon’s work exhibits 
a certain resistance to the charting of a straightforward move from a modernist epistemology 
to a postmodern ontology, as though these were separate spaces. It seems clear, as Katherine 
Hume has signaled, that, when considering Pynchon’s works, “we can no longer think in 
terms of alternate realities” by the time of Inherent Vice.xxx Or, at least, not just in terms of 
alternate realities. There is, in Pynchon’s later works, often a more confined approach to 
strange materialities; they appear not in separate spaces, but integrated into the more singular 
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world. That said, in Bleeding Edge, the DeepArcher network is a good example of a 
subspace; a virtual world that remains separate from the main reality, even while being nested
within it – a space that is other and integrated at the same time, thereby yielding the odd 
topology of knowledge posited by Barad. DeepArcher is both a space apart but also known 
by its presence in the world.
Instead of the shift charted by McHale from epistemology to ontology, which works 
within a dualist framework of mind and body, what we can see emerging over the course of 
Pynchon’s literary career is a form of onto-epistemology, in which knowledge is more 
successfully gained by those who oppose such binaries. It was Pavlov who, Pynchon claims, 
was “fascinated by ‘ideas of the opposite,’” yet Pynchon’s Pavlovian pedophile Pointsman is 
hardly a model to follow (GR 48).
In Pynchon’s novels we are given glimpses of spaces that resist the idea of the 
opposite, including in terms of gender dynamics, but that never wholly break free from a 
binary system. For instance, consider the gender ambiguity of Cyprian Latewood in Against 
the Day that leads to Yashmeen’s pregnancy, via his mouth: “a complex love/sex-relation that 
is as ecstatic as it is healing and transforming,” as Heinz Ickstadt has put it (AD 881-3).xxxi 
This setup is one in which, in Michael Jarvis’s words:
Cyprian demonstrates an understanding of the rhetorical, performative valence of sexual 
identity, a deliberately anti-essentialist reading of his homosexuality which does not 
reduce sexual preference to mere fad, but rather elevates it above identity and gender into
the realm of desire, of love. Because Cyprian performs in and out of the bedroom as a 
dually-sexed subject, he is, like Tiresias, able to possess an empathic knowledge of self 
and other, a wisdom and a completeness that makes achieving gnosis feasible.xxxii
My reading of Pynchon’s works within the frame of a feminist new materialism hits the 
buffers at this point. Cyprian’s pronouns shift from “he” to “she” with corresponding 
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adjective agreements. However, gender remains a binary in which Cyprian is “dually-sexed.” 
It is not that the binary is here destroyed but rather that the character fluidly traverses the 
dualistic structures.
Regardless, then, of whether Pynchon’s novels exhibit instances of an onto-
epistemology that remap binaries of inside and outside into new forms (which they do), it 
does not seem true or fair to state that Pynchon’s works radically extend this thinking into the
realm of gender and sex. The breakdown of dualistic thinking in Pynchon’s works, insofar as 
they intersect with a new materialism, appears limited to certain more traditional, 
philosophical areas of dualistic thought, rather than to the biologism, or otherwise, of new 
materialist feminisms.
Reading Pynchon after Theory
The time of high Theory in literary studies may now have passed. There is also current talk, 
in the prestigious venues of literary studies, of a post-critical movement led by Rita Felski, 
among others.xxxiii Yet, new philosophies are continually generated and provide fresh ways of 
understanding the aesthetic, political, and mimetic contexts for literary work. Philosophy, as I
have pointed out elsewhere, provides us with a common bridge to a mimetic reality that is 
shared with fiction, even when the two disciplinary spaces diverge in their approaches.xxxiv As 
Catherine Belsey writes, “[a]ssumptions about literature involve assumptions about language 
and about meaning, and these in turn involve assumptions about human society. The 
independent universe of literature and the autonomy of criticism are illusory.”xxxv
The various strands of the school known as the “new materialism” are of some help to
us in coming to grips with the works of Thomas Pynchon. For, in many ways, Pynchon’s 
works have often been about the limits of the human perspective on the world. His novels 
have been post-anthropocentric from the consciousness of rocks and lightbulbs through to 
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automated, flying ducks. His writings have also worked against a reductive dualism in which 
consciousness is neither separate from bodily matter nor wholly integrated with it. There is 
certainly scope to say that the onto-epistemology of new materialist schools is present in 
Pynchon’s novels, contesting the chronology asserted by Brian McHale.
Such readings can only go so far, though. Pynchon’s non-human consciousnesses are 
framed through analogy to human psyches, which may be an intrinsic boundary of fiction’s 
ability to represent. Furthermore, the breakdown of dualism that we can detect in Pynchon’s 
novels is rarely framed through recourse to feminist thought about the body, gender, and sex. 
Indeed, while often transgressive, Pynchon’s works remain inside a dualistic framework of 
gender and sex in which transgression is enacted by negation but within the same paradigm 
of thought.
i See Karl Ameriks, “Introduction: Interpreting German Idealism” in Karl Ameriks (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to German Idealism (Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 1-17, for why 
this is a crude and reductive definition.
ii Quentin Meillasoux, Rick Dolphijn, and Iris van der Tuin, “Interview with Quentin Meillasoux” in
New Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies (Open Humanities Press, 2012), p. 72.
iii David Cowart, Thomas Pynchon: The Art of Allusion (Southern Illinois University Press, 1980), p.
36.
iv Martin Paul Eve, Pynchon and Philosophy: Wittgenstein, Foucault and Adorno (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014), pp. 138-45.
v Brian McHale, “Genre as History: Genre-Poaching in Against the Day,” Genre, 42.3-4 (2009), 
doi.org/10.1215/00166928-42-3-4-5, pp. 5-20.
vi For more on this passage, see Joanna Freer, Thomas Pynchon and American Counterculture 
(Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 110.
vii William E. Connolly, “The ‘New Materialism’ and the Fragility of Things,” Millennium, 41.3 
(2013), p. 399.
viii Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. by Ray 
Brassier (Continuum, 2009); Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and 
the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (Duke University Press, 2007); Manuel DeLanda, A 
Thousand Years of Nonlinear History (Zone Books, 1997); Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: 
Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (Columbia University Press, 
1994); Diana H. Coole and Samantha Frost (eds.), New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and 
Politics (Duke University Press, 2010).
ix All of these points are paraphrased and summarised from Connolly, “The ‘New Materialism,’” pp.
399-402.
x Manuel DeLanda, Rick Dolphijn, and Iris van der Tuin, “Interview with Manuel DeLanda” in New
Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies (Open Humanities Press, 2012), pp. 46-47.
xi Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin, New Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies (Open 
Humanities Press, 2012), p. 122.
xii Meillassoux, After Finitude, p. 5.
xiii Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s Like to Be a Thing (University of Minnesota 
Press, 2012).
xiv Meillasoux, Dolphijn, and Tuin, “Interview with Quentin Meillasoux,” p. 80.
xv For more on vitalism in new materialisms, see Jane Bennett, “A Vitalist Stopover on the Way to a 
New Materialism” in Diana H. Coole and Samantha Frost (eds.), New Materialisms: Ontology, 
Agency, and Politics (Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 47-69.
xvi A principle that states that the only absolute certainty is that everything that is could also be 
otherwise.
xvii Brian McHale, “Change of Dominant from Modernist to Postmodernist Writing” in Douwe 
Fokkema and Hans Bertens (eds.), Approaching Postmodernism Papers Presented at a Workshop 
on Postmodernism, Utrecht Publications in General and Comparative Literature, 21 (John 
Benjamins, 1986), pp. 53-79.
xviii Adam Lifshey, Specters of Conquest: Indigenous Absence in Transatlantic Literatures (Fordham 
University Press, 2010), p. 125.
xix James Gourley, Terrorism and Temporality in the Works of Thomas Pynchon and Don DeLillo 
(Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 119; Inger H. Dalsgaard, “Readers and Trespassers: Time Travel, 
Orthogonal Time, and Alternative Figurations of Time in Against the Day” in Jeffrey Severs and 
Christopher Leise (eds.) Pynchon’s Against the Day: A Corrupted Pilgrim’s Guide (University of 
Delaware Press, 2011), pp. 115-38.
xx Simon de Bourcier, Pynchon and Relativity: Narrative Time in Thomas Pynchon’s Later Novels 
(Continuum, 2012), p. 48.
xxi Karen Barad, Rick Dolphijn, and Iris van der Tuin, “Interview with Karen Barad” in New 
Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies (Open Humanities Press, 2012), pp. 48-70.
xxii Sara Ahmed, “Open Forum Imaginary Prohibitions: Some Preliminary Remarks on the Founding 
Gestures of the ‘New Materialism,’” European Journal of Women’s Studies, 15.1 (2008), 
doi.org/10.1177/1350506807084854, p.30.
xxiii Noela Davis, “New Materialism and Feminism’s Anti-Biologism: A Response to Sara Ahmed,” 
European Journal of Women’s Studies, 16.1 (2009), doi.org/10.1177/1350506808098535, p. 75.
xxiv See Donna Haraway, The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant 
Otherness (Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003).
xxv Joanna Freer, “Thomas Pynchon, (Relative) Feminist,” Berfrois, 2011, 
www.berfrois.com/2011/06/thomas-pynchon-relative-feminist-by-joanna-freer/, accessed 31 
January 2017, n.p.
xxvi Freer, Thomas Pynchon and American Counterculture, pp. 126-56.
xxvii Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of 
Partial Perspective,” Feminist Studies, 14.3 (1988), doi.org/10.2307/3178066, p. 595.
xxviii Eve, Pynchon and Philosophy, p. 66.
xxix Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham 
Burchell (Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 11; Karen Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity: 
Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter,” Signs, 28.3 (2003), 
doi.org/10.1086/signs.2003.28.issue-3, p. 829.
xxx Kathryn Hume, “Attenuated Realities: Pynchon’s Trajectory from V. to Inherent Vice,” Orbit: A 
Journal of American Literature, 2.1 (2013), https://doi.org/10.7766/orbit.v2.1.50., n.p.
xxxi Heinz Ickstadt, “History, Utopia and Transcendence in the Space-Time of Against the Day,” 
Pynchon Notes, 54-55 (2008), doi.org/10.16995/pn.37, p. 230.
xxxii Michael Jarvis, “Very Nice Indeed: Cyprian Latewood’s Masochistic Sublime, and the Religious 
Pluralism of Against the Day,” Orbit: A Journal of American Literature, 1.2 (2013), 
doi.org/10.7766/orbit.v1.2.45, p. 13.
xxxiii Cathy N. Davidson and David Theo Goldberg, “Engaging the Humanities,” Profession (2004), 
p. 45; N. Katherine Hayles, How We Think: Digital Media and Contemporary Technogenesis 
(University of Chicago Press, 2012), p. 59; Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus, “Surface Reading: An
Introduction,” Representations, 108.1 (2009), doi.org/10.1525/rep.2009.108.1.1, pp. 1-21; Bruno 
Latour, “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern,” 
Critical Inquiry, 30.2 (2004), pp. 225-248; Rita Felski, The Limits of Critique (University of 
Chicago Press, 2015).
xxxiv Eve, Pynchon and Philosophy, pp. 5-6.
xxxv Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice (Routledge, 2002), p. 24.
